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Post 2/2/95

It's a Recipe for Economic Chaos

Continued progress on reducing the deficit is sound economic policy, but a constitutional amendment requiring annual balance of the federal budget is not. The fallacy in the logic behind the balanced budget amendment begins with the premise that the size of the federal deficit is the result of conscious policy decisions. This is only partly the case. The pace of economic activity also plays an important role in determining the deficit. An economic slowdown automatically depresses tax revenues and increases government spending on such programs as unemployment compensation, food stamps and welfare.

Such temporary increases in the deficit act as "automatic stabilizers," offsetting some of the reduction in the purchasing power of the private sector and cushioning the economy's slide.

would throw the automatic stabilizers into reverse. Congress would be required to raise tax rates or cut spending programs in the face of a recession to counteract temporary increases in the deficit. Rather than moderating the normal ups and downs of the business cycle, fiscal policy would be required to aggravate them.

A simple example from recent economic history should serve as a cautionary tale. In fiscal year 1991, the economy's unanticipated slowdown caused actual government spending for unemployment insurance and related items to exceed the budgeted amount by \$6 billion, and actual revenues to fall short of the budgeted amount by some \$67 billion. In a balanced-budget world, Congress would have been required to offset the resulting shift of more than \$70 billion in the deficit by a combination of tax hikes and spending cuts that by themselves would have sharply worsened the economic downturn—resulting in an additional loss of 1½ percent of GDP and 750,000 jobs.

The version of the amendment passed by the House has no special "escape clause" for recessions—only the general provision that the budget could be in deficit if three-fifths of both the House and Senate agree. This is a far cry from an automatic stabilizer. It is easy to imagine a well-organized minority in either House of Congress holding this provision hostage to its particular political agenda.

In a balanced-budget world—with fiscal policy enjoined to destabilize rather than stabilize the economy—all responsibility for counteracting the economic effects of the business cycle would be placed at the doorstep of the Federal Reserve. The Fed could attempt to meet this increased responsibility by pushing interest rates down more aggressively when the economy softens and raising them more vigorously when it strengthens. But there are several reasons why the Fed would

not be able to moderate the ups and downs of the business cycle on its own as well as it can with the help of the automatic fiscal stabilizers.

First, monetary policy affects the economy indirectly and with notoriously long lags, making it difficult to time the desired effects with precision. By contrast, the automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy swing into action as soon as the economy begins to slow, often well before the Federal Reserve even recognizes the need for compensating action.

Second, the Fed could become handcuffed in the event of a major recession—its scope for action limited by the fact that it can push short-term interest rates no lower than zero, and probably not even that low. By historical standards, the spread between today's short rates of 6 percent and zero leaves uncomfortably little room for maneuver. Between the middle of 1990 and the end of 1992, the Fed reduced the short-term interest rate it controls by a cumulative total of 5¼ percentage points. Even so, the economy sank into a recession from which it has only recently fully recovered—a recession whose severity was moderated by the very automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy the balanced budget amendment would destroy.

Third, the more aggressive actions required of the Fed to limit the increase in the variability of output and employment could actually increase the volatility of financial markets—an ironic possibility, given that many of the amendment's proponents may well believe they are promoting financial stability.

Finally, a balanced budget amendment would create an automatic and undesirable link between interest rates and fiscal policy. An unanticipated increase in interest rates would boost federal interest expense and thus the deficit. The balanced budget amendments under consideration would require that such an unanticipated increase in the deficit be offset within the fiscal year!

In other words, independent monetary policy decisions by the Federal Reserve would require immediate and painful budgetary adjustments. Where would they come from? Not from interest payments and not, with such short notice, from entitlement programs. Rather they would have to come from either a tax increase or from cuts or possible shutdowns in discretionary programs whose funds had not yet been obligated. This is not a sensible way to establish budgetary priorities or maintain the healthy interaction and independence of monetary and fiscal



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Moreover, they do so quickly and automatically, without the need for lengthy debates about the state of the economy and the appropriate policy response.

By the same token, when the economy strengthens again, the automatic stabilizers work in the other direction: tax revenues rise, spending for unemployment benefits and other social safety net programs falls, and the deficit narrows.

A balanced budget amendment

policy.

One of the great discoveries of modern economics is the role that fiscal policy can play in moderating the business cycle. Few if any members of the Senate about to vote on a balanced budget amendment experienced the tragic human costs of the Great Depression, costs made more severe by President Herbert Hoover's well-intentioned but misguided efforts to balance the budget. Unfortunately, the huge deficits inherited from the last decade of fiscal profligacy have rendered discretionary changes in fiscal policy in response to the business cycle all but impossible. Now many of those responsible for the massive run-up in debt during the 1980s are leading the charge to eliminate the automatic stabilizers as well by voting for a balanced budget amendment.

Instead of undermining the government's ability to moderate the economy's cyclical fluctuations by passing such an amendment, why not simply make the hard choices and cast the courageous votes required to reduce the deficit—the kind of hard choices and courageous votes delivered by members of the 103rd Congress when they passed the administration's \$505 billion deficit reduction package?

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